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SQUELCHING VOX POPULI: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
THE INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA
Howard Eastman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its adoption in 1911, the initiative has provided California
citizens with the means to formulate policy independently of the state
legislature.' Recently, however, the California Supreme Court has
moved to limit the people's power of initiative. Last year, in AFL-
CIO v.Eu,2 the state supreme court held that voters cannot use the
initiative to propose an amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. The preceding year, in Legislature of the State of California v.
Deukmejian,' the same court announced that voters cannot use the
initiative to readjust election district boundaries. Each of the pro-
posed initiatives were struck down prior to election day. These deci-
sions suggest a new willingness on the part of the supreme court to
neutralize the power of citizens to enact legislation, and a new un-
willingness to defer review of ballot measures until after election.
This article will explore the value of the initiative as an instru-
ment of "direct democracy" and will discuss the context in which
judicial intervention is justified. Part II examines the theoretical
background of the initiative and the mechanics of the initiative pro-
cess in California. Part III reviews recent decisions affecting the
electorate's power to legislate directly. Part IV weighs the relative
merits of preelection and postelection initiative review. Finally, Part
V advances a set of guidelines designed to prevent unwarranted judi-
cial intrusion without sacrificing judicial control over improper use
of the ballot measures.
© 1985 by Howard Eastman
* J.D., 1984, University of Southern California; Member, California Bar.
1. E.g., the Political Reform Act of 1974, (adopted by initiative, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
81000-91014 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985)), and the sweeping property tax reforms of Proposi-
tion 13, CAL. CONST. amend. XIII A, approved by voters in 1978.
2. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
3. 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INITIATIVE
A. Theory of Direct Legislation
By allocating part of the legislative power to the people, the
initiative process enables voters to enact statutes or to amend the
state constitution without having to act through elected representa-
tives.' Created during the Progressive Era in reaction to unrespon-
sive and sometimes corrupt state legislatures,5 the initiative was in-
tended to promote "direct democracy"-a system of government in
which the people possess a direct voice in the lawmaking process.6
Despite widespread acceptance today,7 direct legislation is still sub-
ject to a lively and lingering debate over its proper scope and
application.8
1. Arguments in Favor of the Initiative
The reasons most commonly advanced in support of direct legis-
lation are: 1) the correction of representative deficiencies; 2) the en-
couragement of public participation in political affairs; and 3) the
symbolic value of the initiative.
First, supporters of the initiative maintain that it corrects the
various shortcomings and abuses of the representative system of gov-
ernment. 9 For various reasons, legislatures are not always responsive
to the needs and wishes of constituents. As one court remarked:
[It] takes outlandish financial resources to mount a campaign
for office, lobbyists play no small part in controlling the destiny
of legislative measures, and in election years our elected repre-
sentatives procrastinate taking action even on urgent matters.
One counter-balance to this trend is to give vitality to the initia-
tive power.'
4. Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 922, 922 (1975).
5. L. PITr, CALIFORNIA CONTROVERSIES 121 (1968). The initiative in California was
instituted in order to "kick the railroad out of politics," namely the Southern Pacific Railroad.
Id. at 120-21.
6. Twenty-three states employ the initiative and referendum. Sirico, The Constitutional-
ity of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IowA L. REV. 637, 637-38 (1980). Other states offer
the initiative and referendum only at the local level. Note, Initiative and Referendum-Do
They Encourage or Impair Better State Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 925, 925 n.1
(1977).
7. See Sirico, supra note 6, at 647.
8. Id. , at 639; Comment, The Scope of the Initiative and Referendum in California, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1717, 1718 (1966).
9. See, e.g., Note, supra note 6, at 925.
10. Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 258, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (1972). Sacra-
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By opening the legislative process to greater citizen participa-
tion, the initiative enables the popular majority to hold its own in the
continuing contest with special interest groups, lobbyists, and politi-
cal forces which are opposed to the majoritarian will.11 The initiative
acts as a "gun behind the door" to remind legislators that a position
adverse to majoritarian interests can be overturned by popular vote. 2
Political reformers have learned to overcome legislative inertia by
"taking the issues to the people." In California alone, citizens have
enacted a comprehensive political reform package,"3 tax reform mea-
sures,' 4 antiwar resolutions,'8 a statewide lottery," and energy and
environmental proposals.17
The second justification for direct legislation posits that the ini-
tiative fosters civic virtue by encouraging the people to participate in
the electoral process and ongoing public debate. 8 Propositions often
receive widespread publicity. Newspaper, radio, and television edito-
rials present the pros and cons of the initiatives, and the citizens
become involved by writing letters to the editor, appearing on talk
shows, or collecting signatures for ballot petitions." These efforts ul-
timately produce a more sophisticated and enlightened electorate.
Public discussion of the issues also serves a first amendment function
by providing citizens an avenue for political expression.2
The final reason concerns the symbolic value of the initiative.
The provisions for direct voting reaffirm that the power to govern is
based on the consent of the people. In a political system that claims
to derive its authority from the people,2 the initiative stands as the
mento is host to more powerful and pervasive lobbies than any other state capitol. L. PITr,
CALIFORNIA CONTROVERSIES 121 (1968).
11. Sirico, supra note 6, at 653-54.
12. Note, supra note 6, at 939.
13. Carlson v. Cory, 139 Cal. App. 3d 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1982); Fair Political
Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 599 P. 2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979).
14. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
15. Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal. 2d 325, 431 P.2d 650, 62 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1967). See
generally Comment, The Local Initiative-A Proper Sounding Board for National Issues?,
1968 UTAH L. REV. 464.
16. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19(d).
17. People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 870, 106 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1973).
18. See. AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 718-19, 686 P.2d at 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 110
(1984) (Lucas, J., dissenting).
19. See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
20. AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 718, 686 P. 2d at 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (1984)
(Lucas, J., dissenting).
21. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (1978).
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ultimate symbol of legitimacy,2" a testimony to the responsiveness of
government to the concerns of its citizens. The power to legislate
gives voters more than nominal control over their political destiny,
and alleviates potential feelings of estrangement and alienation from
the political process. The initiative can also be viewed as the product
of an inexorable historical trend. Five of the last eleven amendments
adopted in the last century to the United States Constitution have
extended the vote to persons previously disenfranchised, thus increas-
ing popular control over government." The initiative is the culmina-
tion of this movement toward grass-roots democracy.
2. Arguments Against the Initiative
Opponents of latitudinal use of the instruments of direct democ-
racy cite four cardinal defects inherent in the initiative process: 1)
majoritarian intemperance; 2) the absence of deliberation; 3) inade-
quate voter comprehension; and 4) dominance by special interest
groups.
The first deficiency is the potential danger that the majority will
abuse its untrammeled power to treat an insular minority differently
without a rational reason closely related to a valid state interest. 4
Minority groups without the resources to act as a bloc at the polls
are susceptible to this majoritarian intemperance. 5 Unlike elected
representatives, voters have no political accountability; they operate
in the absence of political forces and legal principles that ordinarily
constrain elected officials." A majority is therefore capable of dealing
itself benefits at the expense of the remaining minority even though
no relevant differences exist between the two groups.
2 7
Minority groups are best insulated from the caprices of majority
rule by a system of representative government s.2  The purpose for
having broadly based representative assemblies with small constitu-
encies is to give minorities access to legislative deliberations. 29 Fur-
22. Sirico, supra note 6, at 640.
23. U.S. CONST. amend XVII (direct senatorial elections); U.S CONST. amend XIX
(enfranchisement of women); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII (rights of District of Columbia resi-
dents to vote); U.S. CONST. amend XXIV (elimination of poll tax); U.S. CoNST. amend.
XXVI (right of 18-year-olds to vote). See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7 (1980).
24. Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to
Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 881, 902 (1970).
25. Note, supra note 6, at 942.
26. Seeley, supra note 24, at 902.
27. J. ELY, supra note 23, at 7.
28. Seeley, supra note 24, at 905.
29. Allen, The National Initiative Proposal: A Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REV.
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ther, the legislators' reliance on pluralistic consensus formation pre-
vents representative government from too readily violating equal
protection norms.30 Representative action does not always mirror
popular opinion; 31 legislators are expected to vote to promote the
long-term interest of the polity. 2 The general good is therefore bet-
ter served by a republican government in which elected representa-
tives alone are charged with the formation of social policy, as op-
posed to a plebiscite that transforms the transient popular will
directly into law.33
Because the initiative is antithetical to republicanism, its valid-
ity under the Constitution has been questioned. The Constitution
"guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government."3 4 The guaranty clause was designed to limit majority
rule while at the same time ensuring that each state government pos-
sesses a representative character. 5 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
initiative, labelling the issue a nonjusticiable political question.36
The second drawback of direct legislation is the absence of de-
liberation, negotiation, and compromise. There are no opportunities
for public hearings or for interested parties to comment on the lan-
guage of the proposal before it is placed on the ballot.3 7 Ballot mea-
965, 971-72 (1979).
30. Sirico, supra note 6, at 641.
31. See L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at 773.
32. Note, Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REV.
1143, 1146 (1979).
33. Note supra note 6, at 940. Three cases involving "populism run riot" have been
commented on at length: James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969), and Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1966), affd, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
In Valtierra, California voters approved an initiative constitutional amendment prohibit-
ing the development of low-rent housing projects without referendum approval. The U.S. Su-
preme Court, finding no racial classification, upheld the challenged constitutional provision.
402 U.S. at 143.
In Hunter, a municipal regulation prevented the implementation of any ordinance relat-
ing to racial housing discrimination unless approved by referendum. The U.S. Supreme Court
found that the ordinance contained an impermissible racial classification in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 393 U.S. at 393.
In Mulkey, California voters approved a proposition that prevented the state from inter-
fering with the right of property owners to refuse to sell, ease or rent to anyone they desired.
The state supreme court declared the measure violative of the equal protection clause. 64 Cal.
2d at 545, 413 P.2d at 836, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 892. The Supreme Court affirmed. Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 373.
34. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
35. Sirico, supra note 6, at 64.4-45.
36. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 233 U.S. 118 (1912).
37. Note, supra note 4, at 927.
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sures are submitted in an extreme, final form to voters, who must
approve or reject them on the terms offered. The end product may be
poorly drafted, internally inconsistent, 8 or may conflict with existing
law. Furthermore, direct legislation is not subject to the executive
veto power, which often curbs legislative excesses. 39
By contrast, when a bill is under consideration by the Califor-
nia Legislature, the drafters have the opportunity to consider the
views of interested parties, or to form a committee to ascertain the
facts and make a recommendation."0 If conflicts exist between the
Senate and Assembly versions, the differences will be resolved by a
joint committee. The final compromise, which must be sent to the
Governor for either a signature or a veto,"1 is more likely to reflect
the concerns of the affected parties.'
The third defect inherent in direct legislation is that certain is-
sues are beyond the comprehension of the electors. The initiative
process is predicated upon the idea that an informed and educated
electorate exists. Generally, however, the public is unable to evaluate
the impact of complex legislation.' Despite "plain language" ballot
requirements,"" the substance of a measure'" as well the sophistica-
tion of the language may frustrate responsible voting."" In addition,
electors are often vulnerable to misleading and deceptive campaign
advertising practices,' 7 and may become distracted by the numerous
38. Id., at 930. An example is the ill-fated "Clean Environment Act." The wording of
this 1972 proposition inadvertently contained a double negative, which reversed the intended
meaning. While such drafting oversights can be corrected by judicial interpretation, the propo-
nents of that measure were spared the embarrassment because the measure was defeated.
39. Note, supra note 32, at 1146-47. Direct legislation is immune from repeal by the
legislature; repeal can be effected only by a subsequently approved ballot measure. See infra
note 77.
40. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 11.
41. A gubernatorial veto in California may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of each
house. CAL. CONST art. IV, § 10.
42. Note, supra note 4, at 932.
43. Note, supra note 32, at 1151.
44. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 88001(e), 88003 (West 1976).
45. For example, some measures deal wilh questions of tax policy or acceptable levels of
pollution. Note, supra note 4, at 934 n.64.
46. Note, supra note 6, at 941. Evidence exists that voter pamphlets are beyond the
reading comprehension of most voters, even though they are prepared in accordance with plain
language requirements. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Ex-
perience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 505, 605 n.
372 (1982).
47. For example, the campaign slogan for Proposition 22 in the 1972 general election
was "FOR FARMWORKERS' RIGHTS ...YES ON 22." Yet the measure was calcu-
lated to curb the power of farmworkers' unions and was opposed by the United Farm Work-
ers. Lowenstein, supra note 46, at 522-23.
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and lengthy propositions placed on the ballot. 8 Representatives, by
contrast, have more expertise than the general public in the drafting
of legislation.' " They are usually better educated, have better access
to relevant information, and may consult advisors and staff.
The final shortcoming of direct democracy is that the initiative
process is capable of being subverted by special interest groups. Un-
less a measure faces no substantial opposition, a ballot campaign
soon becomes a costly undertaking. Voter preferences are influenced
by the prevalence of the media, the stratagems of public relations
firms, and the impact of political sloganeering.50 Because of their
greater ability to purchase media time and space,51 well-organized
and heavily-funded interest groups have a special advantage. Al-
though empirical studies reveal that money is only one of many vari-
ables affecting election results, 2 - it is undeniable that the better-
funded side holds the edge in a ballot contest, all things being
equal. 58
Whether widespread use of the initiative is boon or bane seems
to elude analysis. It is ultimately a subjective question, depending on
whether one is generally in favor of or opposed to the outcomes of
the kinds of measures proposed by ballot.5" But the incidents of pop-
ular legislation that actually discriminate against insular minorities
are quite few,5 5 and the Constitution is always available as a bul-
wark against such violations when they do occur. This article views
voters as generally informed and responsible citizens, possessed of
48. Note, supra note 4, at 934-35.
49. Note, supra note 6, at 940.
50. "The slogan is the epitome of the initiative campaign. Campaign managers realize
that they must, for the sake of impact, reduce an initiative to a short slogan that will fit a
billboard or keynote a short radio or television advertisement." Note, supra note 4, at 937.
51. Allen, supra note 29, 1028. The Political Reform Act of 1974, CAL. GovT CODE
§§ 81000-94014 (West 1976), attempted to reduce the prevalence of vote-buying by placing
limitations on initiative campaign expenditures. The California Supreme Court, however, rely-
ing on Buckley v. Vallejo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), found that the limitations violated the first
amendment right of political expression. Hardie v. Fong Eu, 18 Cal. 3d 371, 556 P.2d 301,
134 Cal. Rptr. 201, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1976).
52. Lowenstein, supra note 46, at 505; Allen, supra note 29, at 1028-38. Studies reveal
that one-sided "affirmative"spending, i.e., spending calculated to enact legislation through bal-
lot voting, usually is not a critical factor in the election. Lowenstein, supra note 46, at 545.
However, one-sided "negative" spending, i.e., spending intended to defeat a given ballot mea-
sure, is "generally effective" and frequently decisive. Id. at n.164. The latter finding, however,
may be due to the natural predisposition of voters to vote "no," especially when confused or
ambivalent about the issues. Allen, supra note 29. at 1036; see infra note 134.
53. Allen, supra note 29, at 1036.
54. Id. at 1008.
55. Id. at 1010-16.
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rational judgment, and committed to employing the instruments of
direct democracy for the realization of the common good.56
B. The Mechanics of the Initiative Process in California
The basic law governing the initiative process in California is
found in article II of the state constitution. Article II proclaims that
"[a]ll political power is inherent in the people. Government is insti-
tuted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the
right to alter or reform it when the public good may require." 7 Al-
though the legislative power is vested in the California Legislature,
the "people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and refer-
endum."58 The initiative is "the power of electors to propose statutes
and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them."59
The referendum is "the power of electors to approve or reject stat-
utes or parts of statutes" already enacted by the legislature.60
The steps required to place an initiative on the ballot in Cali-
fornia are fairly typical of the procedures followed in most states. 61
Before circulating the initiative petitions for signatures, proponents
of the measure must submit a copy to the California Attorney Gen-
eral,62 who reviews its form and prepares a title and summary "of
56. One of the most remarkable findings that emerges from an examination of
the various studies of the initiative is that they consistently conclude that the
initiative process has, on balance, performed in most respects as well as the
legislative process. To be sure, there are studies critical of the process, but they
are limited in scope.
Id. at 1009-10.
While the initiative and referendum may not fit into a given philosopher's
democratic model, and while these powers may, like any others, be misused
from time to time, one would hope the courts will not fall prey to the elitist
argument that the people do not know what is best for them and therefore need
someone else to tell them. Pragmatically, the institutions work; like their repre-
sentatives, the people may sometimes approve mischievous or unconstitutional
measures, but by and large, as studies show, they are good legislators.
Comment, supra note 8, at 1747-48.
57. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
58. Id.
59. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
60. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9. The California Constitution also provides for the "recall,"
which is the power of the people to remove an elected official from office. CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 13. The term "initiative" as used in this article includes the referendum, unless otherwise
noted. The terms "measure," "proposal," and "proposition," with or without the preceding
term "ballot," all refer to the initiative. For a detailed discussion of the various instruments of
direct democracy, see Comment, supra note 8, at 1719-21.
61. Comment, Preelection Judicial Review: Taking the Initiative in Voter Protection,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1216, 1218 (1983).
62. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3502 (West 1977).
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the chief purposes and points of the proposed measure. e6  The title
and summary are placed on the petitions and in the ballot pam-
phlets.64 After the Attorney General returns the petitions, the propo-
nents have 150 days to gather signatures.6"
The number of signatures required to place a proposal on the
ballot varies. Initiative amendments to the constitution require a
number of signatures equal to eight percent of the total votes cast in
the most recent gubernatorial election.66 In the case of an initiative
statute, the number of signatures required is five percent of the total
votes cast.67 Only registered voters of a given county are entitled to
sign a petition circulated in that county."8 If the proponents manage
to collect the required number of valid signatures69 within the allot-
ted time, the California Secretary of State will qualify the measure
to appear on the ballot.7
0
Before election, each voter receives a ballot pamphlet prepared
by the Secretary of State.7 1 The ballot pamphlet contains a copy of
the full text of the proposed law7 2 as well as the text of any specific
constitutional or statutory provisions that the initiative measure pro-
poses to repeal or to revise.73 In addition, the ballot pamphlet must
include the title and summary prepared by the Attorney General, 74
any pro and con arguments and rebuttals submitted by interested
parties,7 5 and a detailed analysis of the measure prepared by the
63. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3503 (West 1977). See also CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(d).
64. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3507-3508, 3571(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 88002(a) (West 1976).
65. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3513 (West 1977).
66. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3524 (West Supp. 1985).
67. Id.
68. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3517 (West 1977).
69. The Clerk or Registrar of voters of each county determines the number of valid
signatures and transmits those findings to the Secretary of State. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3520
(West Supp. 1985).
70. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b)-(c). The petitions must be submitted to the Secretary of
State no later than 131 days prior to election. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 8(c); CAL. ELEC. CODE §
3514 (West 1977).
71. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3568 (West 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88000 (West 1976).
72. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3570(a) (West 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88001(a) (West
1976).
73. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3570(b), 3571(e) (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § § 88001(b), 88002(e) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985).
74. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3571(a) (West 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88002(a) (West
1976).
75. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3570(c) (West Supp. 1985); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88001(c)
(West 1976). If no pro or con arguments are submitted by interested parties, the Secretary of
State must request that voters submit arguments. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3559 (West 1977).
19851
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Legislative Analyst."6 The proposal will become law if approved by
a simple majority of the voters."
III. JUDICIAL INVALIDATION OF INITIATIVE MEASURES:
A. Legislature of the State of California v. Deukmejian and
AFL-CIO v. Eu
Until recently, California courts would not invalidate a ballot
proposition prior to election "absent a clear showing of invalidity.""8
The supreme court's decisions in Legislature of the State of Califor-
nia v. Deukmejian79 and AFL-CIO v. Eu,80 however, signaled the
demise of this rule. Deukmejian and AFL-CIO v. Eu are the first
decisions in thirty-five years to order that a qualified initiative pro-
posal be stricken from the ballot."1
In Deukmejian, the governor called a special election in order to
submit a statutory initiative measure that would readjust state legis-
lative and congressional election districts.8" The state legislature
sought to restrain the Governor and election officials from holding
the special election.
The California Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, 8 first
recited the general rule that postelection review of challenges to bal-
lot propositions is preferable to preelection review, which "disrupt[s]
the electoral process by preventing the exercise of the people's
franchise .... ."' The general rule, however, is subject to excep-
tions if "serious consequences will result if consideration of the valid-
76. CAt. ELEC. CODE § 3572 (West 1977); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88002(b) (West 1976).
The Legislative Analyst prepares an impartial description of the measure and a fiscal analysis
of the measure that projects the amount of any increase or decrease in revenue or cost to state
or local governments. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 88003 (West 1976). In addition, the Attorney
General must include in the title the estimated financial impact, if any, of the proposal. CAL.
ELEc. CODE § 3504 (West 1977).
77. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a). Once enacted, a ballot measure can be amended only
by subsequent approval of the electors unless amendment by the legislature is expressly au-
thorized in the initiative statute. CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 10(c).
78. Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 14, 641 P.2d 200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101
(1982).
79. 34 Cal. 3d 658 , 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
80. 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984).
81. Prior to Deukmejian and AFL-CIO v. Eu, the last case holding a qualified initiative
measure invalid was McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 797 (1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 918 (1949).
82. State law vests the Governor with the power to order a special election. CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 8(c); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2651 (West Supp. 1985).
83. Joining the court's opinion were Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Kaus,
Broussard, Reynoso, and Grodin. Justice Richardson dissented.
84. 34 Cal. 3d at 665, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
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ity of a measure is delayed until after an election" or upon "a clear
showing of invalidity."' 85 The majority explained that these excep-
tions were met in the present case. The "high costs" of holding the
special election 86 and the impossibility of conducting the primary
election in an orderly fashion were the "serious consequences" that
would result from postelection review.
The majority also discerned a clear showing of invalidity. Arti-
cle XXI of the California Constitution directs the legislature to
redraw district lines only in the year following the national census.
87
The court reasoned that because "the reserved power to enact stat-
utes by initiative is a legislative power, '"88 a statutory initiative is
subject to the same limitations as legislative action. The court con-
cluded that just as the legislature is powerless to realign voting
boundaries more than once per decade, so are the people powerless
to accomplish the same by initiative.
After objecting to the grant of preelection review because of the
absence of "clear invalidity," Justice Richardson, in dissent, re-
minded the majority that the power of initiative was not a right
granted the people, but a power reserved by them. Because the lan-
guage of the constitution does not prohibit reapportionment by initi-
ative, the people should retain "their constitutional initiative power
over reapportionment, even if both a legislative and an initiative plan
have been adopted in the same census period."89 In any event, the
dissent urged, the court should not fashion a remedy because the
"makeup and apportionment of the Legislature involved peculiarly
political questions that are not appropriate for this court to decide.
They are far better entrusted to the collective political wisdom of the
Legislature subject to the power of initiative and referendum re-
85. Id. at 666, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
86. Id. State and local governments would have had to spend an estimated $15,000,000
in order to conduct the special election.
87. In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under
the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall
adjust the boundary line of the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board
of Equalization districts ....
CAL. CONST. art. XXI.
Under article XXI's predecessor article, the legislature could not alter election district
boundaries more that once per decade. Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 92 P. 353 (1907).
The court in Deukmejian reasoned that "absent evidence that the people intended a different
interpretation, it must be inferred that in the drafting and adopting of article XXI, the prior
judicial interpretation of that language was considered and a similar interpretation of that
[predecessor) article was intended." 34 Cal. 3d at 672, 669 P.2d at 25, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
88. 34 Cal. 3d. at 673, 669 P.2d at 26, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
89. 34 Cal. 3d at 683, 669 P.2d at 35, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 799. (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
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served to the people."90
AFL-CIO v. Eu, decided the year after Deukmejian, is the most
recent decision leading to the invalidation of a qualified initiative
measure in California. The AFL-CIO sought to enjoin the Secretary
of State of California from placing an initiative on the November
1984 general election ballot. The purpose of the initiative was to
order the state legislature, on penalty of loss of salary, to apply to
Congress to convene a constitutional convention. The purpose of the
convention was to propose an amendment to the United States Con-
stitution that would require a balanced federal budget.91 In the event
that the state legislature failed to act, the proposed measure in-
structed the Secretary of State to apply directly to Congress on be-
half of the people. 2
90. Id. at 685, 669 P.2d at 36, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 800 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Sliver v. Brown, 63 Cal. 2d 270, 280, 405 P.2d 132, 139, 46 Cal. Rptr. 308, 315 (1905)).
91. The U.S. Senate had approved a constitutional amendment to balance the federal
budget, but the amendment failed to garner the necessary two-thirds vote in the House of
Representatives. Balanced budget advocates were therefore forced to resort to the alternative
method of proposing an amendment by calling a constitutional convention. AFL-CIO v. Eu,
36 Cal. 3d at 691-92, 686 P.2d at 611-12, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92. See also Note, The Bal-
anced Budget Amendment: An Inquiry Into Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1600, 1600-
01 (1983).
92. The proposed measure provided:
Section One. (a) The People of the State of California hereby mandate that
the California Legislature adopt the following resolution and submit the same to
the Congress of the United States under the provisions of Article V of the Con-
stitution of the United States:
That the Congress of the United States is urged to propose and submit to
the several states an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to
require, with certain exceptions, that the federal budget be balanced; and
That application is hereby made to the Congress of the United States, pur-
suant to Article V of the Constitution of the United States, to call a convention
for the sole purpose of proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States to require, with certain exceptions , that the federal budget be
balanced; and
This application constitutes a continuing application in accordance with
Article V of the Constitution of the United States until at least two-thirds of the
several states have made similar applications pursuant to Article V of the
United States Constitution;
(b) The Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to transmit copies of this
application, upon its adoption by the California Legislature, to the President
and Secretary of the United States Senate and the Speaker and Clerk of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States.
Section Three. (a) The people of the State of California hereby adopt the
resolution set forth in Section One of this initiative measure; and (b) If the
California Legislature fails to adopt the resolution set forth in Section One of
the initiative measure within forty (40) legislative days of the approval of this
INITIATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
In an opinion by Justice Broussard,9" the California Supreme
Court first dismissed the objection to its exercise of preelection re-
view. Adopting the position of Justice Mosk's separate opinion in
Brosnahan v. Eu,94 the majority stated that the rule against preelec-
tion review "applies only the contention that an initiative is uncon-
stitutional because of its substance," '95 and not when "the challenge
goes to the power of the electorate to adopt the proposal in the first
instance . . ... " Inasmuch as the opponents of this initiative chal-
lenged the constitutional power of the people to adopt such a mea-
sure, the court concluded that preelection review was appropriate.
Next, the majority examined the language of article V of the
United States Constitution, which provides for a constitutional con-
vention upon "Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the
several States."9 The court interpreted "Legislatures" as referring
only to the representative lawmaking bodies of the several states, and
not the "whole of the state legislative power, including the reserved
power of initiative." '98 Consequently, only the legislature acting in
its representative capacity has the power to call a constitutional con-
vention. Because a state may not, through the process of initiative,
compel its legislators to apply for a constitutional convention, the
proposed initiative violated article V.
The court also determined that the proposed initiative violated
the state constitution. Article II of the state constitution limits the
initiative to the proposal of statutes or amendments to the state con-
initiative measure, the Secretary of State of California shall transmit the resolu-
tion adopted pursuant to this Section to the President and Secretary of the
United States Senate and the Speaker and Clerk of the House of Representa-
tives of the Congress of the United States.
AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d. at 692-93, 686 P.2d. at 612-13, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93.
93. Joining Justice Broussard were Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Reynoso, and
Crodin. Justice Kaus filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice Lucas dissented.
94. 31 Cal. 3d 1, 5, 641 P.2d 200, 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (1982) (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting). See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
95. 36 Cal. 3d at 695, 686 P.2d at 614, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (quoting Brosnahan v. Eu,
31 Cal. 3d 1, 6, 641 P.2d 200, 202, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (1982) (Mosk, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 696, 686 P.2d at 614, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (quoting Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d
at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 785).
97. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). Article V states: "The Congress, whenever
two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitu-
tion, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments .... "
98. 36 Cal. 3d at 697, 686 P.2d at 615, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 95. No previous decision in
any court had addressed the question of whether the term "Legislatures" in article V embraces
the reserved power of initiative. Id. at 699, 686 P.2d at 617, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
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stitution. 99 The balanced budget measure violated the state constitu-
tion because it was neither a statute nor an amendment, but merely
a resolution, defined by the majority as "an enactment which only
declares a public purpose and does not establish means to accomplish
that purpose."' 00
In dissent, Justice Lucas lamented the "disturbing trend" to-
ward deciding issues that might have been rendered moot by the
election, and that in any event could be addressed after election.''
That the initiative was challenged on nonsubstantive grounds was no
justification for this "rush to judgment." Because a jurisdictional
challenge can be made in every case, a measure must be clearly inva-
lid before it merits accelerated review. The dissent also remarked
that state courts should not decide the political question of the valid-
ity of applications for a constitutional convention. The sole arbiter of
such questions should be Congress, "the body alone entrusted by the
federal Constitution with the responsibility to receive and review
such applications.' ' 01
Brosnahan v. Eu,'03 decided only a year before Deukmejian,
stands in bold contrast to the approach taken by AFL-CIO v. Eu and
Deukmejian. In Brosnahan, opponents of Proposition 8, the "Vic-
tims' Bill of Rights,' 0 4 asserted that the measure violated the state
constitution, and could not be placed on the ballot, because it revised
rather than amended the state constitution,'0 5 and contained more
than one subject.'0 6 Opponents of Proposition 8 also asserted that the
proponents failed to obtain the requisite number of valid signatures.
Speaking through Justice Richardson,' 0 7  the supreme court
99. Article II decrees that "It]he initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes
and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).
100. 36 Cal. 3d at 712 n.23, 686 P.2d at 626 n.23, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 106 n.23.
101. Id. at 717-18, 686 P.2d at 630, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 718-19, 686 P.2d at 631, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
103. 31 Cal. 3d 1, 641 P.2d 200, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982).
104. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.
105. Voters may only amend, and not substantially revise, the state constitution by way
of initiative. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. The theory is that a constitution is an instrument
of permanent and abiding nature. Comprehensive changes to the fundamental charter, there-
fore, must be accomplished through the elaborate procedures of convening a constitutional con-
vention and the subsequent popular ratification, and not through the less solemn, less delibera-
tive process of initiative. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 221-22, 583 P.2d 1281, 1284-85, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 242-43
(1978).
106. CAL. CONST. art II, § 8(d) (West 1983). See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying
text. ,
107. Joining the court's opinion were Justices Richardson, Kaus and Reynoso. Justice
Broussard concurred. Justice Mosk concurred in part and dissented in part. Chief Justice Bird
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summarily refused to reach the constitutional issues. The court
stated that "in the absence of some clear showing of invalidity," ' 8
challenges to ballot propositions should be reviewed "after an elec-
tion rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the
exercise of the people's franchise."1 9 The court also found no viola-
tion of the statutory signature requirements because the Legislature
had adopted an urgency measure deeming the measure qualified.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE INITIATIVE PROCESS
A paradox in American political theory is why unelected, politi-
cally unaccountable judges possess the power to declare acts by
popularly elected officials unconstitutional." 0 The apparent illogic of
this notion also applies to direct legislation. Initiatives, after all, em-
body the direct will of the people, whereas the legality of legislative
enactments rests on the authority delegated to representatives by con-
stituents. Concerns about the legitimacy of judicial review, therefore,
should apply with equal force when a direct act of the people is held
to judicial scrutiny. As explained below, whether review occurs
before or after election has a bearing on the legitimacy of judicial
review of the initiative.
A. Preelection and Postelection Review
1. Preelection Review
The central question in preelection or accelerated review is
whether a given proposition is qualified to appear on the ballot."'
The advantages to preelection review are that an early invalidation
spares the proponents of the measure the cost of processing a void
petition, and relieves both proponents and opponents of the expenses
dissented. Justice Newman dissented without opinion.
108. 31 Cal. 3d at 4, 641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101. Opponents of Proposition
8 did, in fact, mount a challenge to the Victim's Bill of Rights following the election. Bros-
nahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982). A sharply divided
court concluded that the measure was constitutional.
109. 31 Cal. 3d at 4, 641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
110. J. ELY, supra note 23, at 4-5. In California, however, state judges are elected
officials. CAL CONST. art. VI, § 16. But because strict rules of election conduct are imposed on
state judges, e.g., CAL. R. CT. app., division II (CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANON 7) (1974),
it is doubtful whether state judges are as politically accountable as elected representatives.
Perhaps elected judges are most appropriately labeled "quasi-accountable."
111. In California, writs of mandamus or prohibition may compel or prevent certifica-
tion of the initiative to appear on the ballot. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1067-1105 (West 1980
& Supp. 1985).
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incurred by advocating the passage or defeat of a void measure.1 2
More significantly, preelection invalidation affords the proponents a
second chance to qualify the proposal for the ballot, providing the
defect is curable prior to election. 1 '
There are also institutional benefits to accelerated review. Pree-
lection litigation generates less publicity or controversy than its pos-
telection counterpart because the people, not having voted on the
measure, are usually unaware of its existence. This allows courts to
decide the merits of the case in the relative obscurity surrounding
most judicial decisions, without the fear of becoming embroiled in a
political controversy." 4 However, because of this less politically con-
strained environment, preelection review tempts courts to invalidate
proposals as merely unacceptable rather than as unconstitutional.' 1"
Preelection review poses severe time limitations because courts
strive to decide preelection challenges before impending election
deadlines."' At the state supreme court level, a special hearing must
be scheduled, and the usual procedures for briefing, oral argument,
and internal conference meetings must be expedited. Often the liti-
gants themselves have inadequate time to prepare their briefs. This
"rush to judgment" has two consequences. First, the court's attention
and resources are diverted from its regular business, which generally
consists of a backlog of several hundred pending cases."' Second, the
court is left with insufficient time to give the issues careful considera-
tion and to reach a reasoned determination." 8 Although initiative
issues are usually complex and presented under adverse circum-
stances, 1 9 it is not unusual for the court to file its opinion several
days after oral argument.' The court is frequently forced to work
from an incomplete record. 12 ' Also, a decision to strike a measure
from the ballot is irrevocable, and if incorrect, deprives the people of
112. Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 257, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (1972).
113. For example, if the measure is defective because an insufficient number of qualified
signatures have been collected, the proponents can obtain the requisite signatures by way of a
supplemental petition. Id.
114. Comment, supra note 61, at 1233-34.
115. See J. ELY, supra note 23, at 44.
116. See AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 694, 686 P.2d at 613, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
117. Id. at 719, 686 P.2d at 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Lucas, J., dissenting). The
rush to judgment before election day prevented Justice Lucas from developing some of his
dissenting arguments. Id. at 724, 686 P.2d at 634, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 114 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
118. Id. at 697 n.10, 686 P.2d at 615 n.10, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 95 n.10.
119. Id. at 719, 686 P.2d at 630, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Comment, supra note 61, at 1230.
[Vol. 25
INITIATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
a constitutional right of political participation.
Finally, a court engaging in preelection review runs the risk of
deciding a controversy that will become moot if the measure is de-
feated at polls. "[T]he normal arguments in favor of the passive vir-
tues suggest that a court not adjudicate an issue until it is clearly
required to do so. If the measure passes, there will be ample time to
rule on its validity. If the measure fails, judicial action will not be
required." '122 Because courts must not decide constitutional questions
unnecessarily, courts in a majority of states hold that preelection
challenges involving constitutional issues are unripe, and hence are
not justicable. 2 8
2. Postelection Review
On the whole, postelection challenges are more justicable than
preelection challenges. An approved measure usually takes effect the
day after election, 2" which means that a challenge to it cannot be
dismissed as unripe for adjudication. Deciding the propriety of an
initiative after election provides the court with ample time for careful
deliberation, reasoning, and drafting of the opinion; the court is not
pressed to render its decision before election, nor is it required to
expedite internal procedures for briefing, oral argument, and confer-
ence meetings.
By deferring trial until after election, however, postelection re-
view leading to an invalidation means that persons and organizations
will have devoted time and resources to support a void measure.
Such waste could be avoided by enjoining the measure from appear-
ing on the ballot in the first place. Interested parties and state and
local governments will have to incur further expenses if the measure
is placed before voters a second time. And an initiative overturned
after election is apt to confuse voters and to frustrate the will of those
who approved it by denying them the beneficial effects of the law
they enacted. 25
Postelection review can also have adverse institutional conse-
quences for the judiciary if the courts are forced to upset a hotly-
contested political measure. 26Alternatively, the higher visibility of
postelection litigation may influence tribunals to uphold a measure
122. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d at 666, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784-85.
123. Comment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, 14 U.C.D.
L. REV. 461, 479 (1980).
124. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a).
125. Comment, supra note 61, at 1231.
126. See id. at 1231-32.
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that deserves to be invalidated and that would otherwise have been
pronounced unconstitutional if litigation had been instituted at the
preelection phase.
B. A Question of Legitimacy: Deukmejian and AFL-CIO v. Eu
Revisited
Prior to Deukmejian, state courts generally refrained from en-
tertaining preelection challenges to initiative measures "in the ab-
sence of some clear showing of invalidity."' 7 Deukmejian did not
jettison the "clear invalidity" rule, but added that accelerated review
is appropriate whenever: 1) "serious consequences will result if con-
sideration of the validity of a measure is delayed until after an elec-
tion," '  or 2) "the challenge goes to the power of the electorate to
adopt the proposal in the first instance.' 1 29
Despite this expansion of the clear invalidity rule, the proposal
at issue in Deukmejian still satisfied the earlier clear invalidity stan-
dard. Article XXI of the state constitution decrees that election dis-
trict boundary lines shall be adjusted in the year following the na-
tional decennial census.'8 0 From that provision it easily follows that
redistricting may occur only in the year following the census, i.e.,
once per decade, as under federal law. "'
The preelection invalidation in Deukmejian had the additional
virtue of preventing substantial public and private waste. The initia-
tive in that case was slated for a special election. The costs of holding
that special election were estimated at $15,000,000,32 an expendi-
ture that would have been needlessly incurred by deferring litigation
until after election.
By contrast, AFL-CIO v. Eu involved neither a clear showing of
invalidity 8 nor the diversion of substantial waste. The balanced
budget amendment was not "clearly invalid" because whether the
people can. directly call a constitutional convention was a question of
127. Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200, 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101
(1982).
128. 34 Cal. 3d at 666, 669 P.2d at 20, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
129. 34 Cal. 3d at 667, 669 P.2d at 21, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
130. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
131. Permanent Reapportionment Act, 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1929).
132. 34 Cal. 3d at 666, 669 P.2d at 785, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 21. When then Governor
Reagan called a special election for a tax reform initiative, the election costs to the state ex-
ceeded $20,000,000. Note, supra note 4, at 941 n.91.




first impression, and one not easily resolved by resorting to the text
of the federal Constitution. And inasmuch as the balanced budget
initiative was scheduled for a general election, no substantial govern-
mental expenditures or waste would have been incurred by placing
the measure on the ballot.
As with the vast majority of propositions, the ballot measure at
issue in AFL-CIO v. Eu was probably destined to die at the polls,
thus eliminating the necessity for judicial review.134 It is true that
some quarters supported the elimination of the federal deficit. 38 But
if the proposal had been placed on the ballot, the ensuing public
debate might have led to the consensus that although a reduced defi-
cit may be desirable,1"' the federal government cannot operate effec-
tively without incurring a budget deficit from time to time.' 37
Of course, one can never be too certain how citizens will re-
spond to a given measure. But even if the citizens had approved the
balanced budget amendment initiative, the question presented in
AFL-CIO v. Eu still may have been rendered moot. Congress might
have concluded, as did the California Supreme Court, that the peo-
ple's application to convene a constitutional convention was void
under Article V of the United States Constitution. That provision
provides for a constitutional convention 8" upon "Application of the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States,"'3 9 rather than upon
direct application by the people through their power of initiative.
Disposing of the case before election also had the effect of deny-
ing the electorate an opportunity to express its views on the desira-
bility of a balanced budget, and of preventing representatives from
134. Defeat at the polls is the fate of the vast majority of ballot measures. The electorate
is naturally predisposed to voting "no" on initiatives; nearly 75% of the proposals presented to
the public have been defeated. Note, supra note 4, at 927.
135. President Reagan promised to balance the federal budget in his 1980 and 1984
presidential campaigns. Presidents since Franklin D. Roosevelt have also promised to do the
same. At the time AFL-CIO v. Eu was decided, 32 states had formally applied to Congress to
call a constitutional convention to balance the budget. AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal.3d at 692, 686
P.2d at 611-12, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92. See also Note, The Balanced Budget Amendment:
An Inquiry Into Appropriateness, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1600 (1983). This article expresses no
opinion as to the merits or desirability of a balanced federal budget or a reduced federal budget
deficit.
136. The projected federal budget deficit for 1985 is $222 billion, the largest in history.
1985 FACTS ON FILE 2307, at 74.
137. The U.S. government has never operated without incurring a budget deficit at the
end of each fiscal year, including the first year of nationhood.
138. Cf AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d at 719, 686 P.2d at 631, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 111
(Lucas, J., dissenting).
139. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying
text.
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taking account of those views. The court responded that this "argu-
ment misunderstands the purpose of the initiative in California. It is
not a public opinion poll. It is a method of enacting legislation, and
if the proposed measure does not enact legislation . . . it should not
be on the ballot. '1 40 This language, however, is contrary to Farley v.
Healy,14 1 in which Justice Traynor led the court to uphold an initia-
tive measure urging the withdrawal of American troops from
Vietnam.
None of the objections raised in this article conflicts with the
substance of AFL-CIO v. Eu, for the court probably arrived at the
correct result. The reason the Constitution has endured for two cen-
turies, according to John Hart Ely, is that it generally does not em-
brace substantive values, but establishes rights of procedural fairness
and political participation. 4 If the people are permitted to propose
a constitutional amendment directly, there is the risk that they will
enshrine transitory but deeply felt substantive values, such as prohi-
bition, 1 48 rather than addressing more lasting concerns of process and
structure.
The objections presented in this article are concerned solely
with the timing of review. The power of judicial review carries a
concomitant limitation: the power may be exercised only in a case or
controversy.1 44 The justifications for this restriction are twofold.
First, experience teaches that "the hard, confining and yet enlarging
context of a real controversy leads to sounder and more enduring
judgments.' 45 Second, limiting jurisdiction to cases or controversies
ensures that courts will not intrude into areas committed to the coor-
dinate branches.' 4 6 Judicial independence is predicated on judicial
self-restraint; courts will be rebuked by the other branches if they
extend their jurisdiction beyond concrete questions presented in an
140. 36 Cal. 3d at 695, 686 P.2d at 613-14, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
141. 67 Cal. 2d 325, 62 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1967).
142. J. ELY, supra note 23, at 87, 92, 99-100 (1980); Note, supra note 135, at 1604.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (prohibiting manufacture, sale or transportation of
liquor) (repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI).
144. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 12 (1983).
The case or controversy doctrine holds less sway over some state courts than others. Some state
courts may render advisory opinions, a practice forbidden in federal court. A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115 (1962). This practice is also forbidden in California.
Younger v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 116, 119-20, 577 P.2d 1014, 1025, 145 Cal. Rptr. 674,
685 (1978).
145. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115 (1962).





As a result of the case or controversy doctrine, no court will
entertain a constitutional challenge before the statute in dispute is
approved by the legislature.' 4 Yet this is analogous to what happens
when an initiative is reviewed prior to voter approval. Such review
raises questions of legitimacy for two reasons. First, judicial review
that does not rest on a case or controversy is ultra vires, as it invades
the spheres of influence reserved to the political branches or to the
people. Second, the power of initiative amounts to a right of political
participation. That vital right should be scrutinized only under con-
ditions most conducive to a correct judicial determination. Courts
should not close a channel of political change without, in the words
of Felix Frankfurter, "that clear concreteness provided when a ques-
tion emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a
clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multi-fac-
eted situation."'' Although questions of legitimacy can be raised
any time the judiciary upsets a law enacted by the people, judicial
invalidations of ballot measures lack legitimacy when they are not
tied to the flesh-and-blood facts of an actual, postelection case.
V. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
INITIATIVES
The proper role for the judiciary in reviewing initiative mea-
sures is difficult to define. A judicial body that upholds an initiative
may contribute to the impairment of the rights of insular minorities;
a judicial body that strikes down an initiative runs the risk of impos-
ing its own values on a majority that does not share those values.
Courts must harmonize these two conflicting principles when re-
viewing challenges to initiative measures. As posited in the preceding
section, the malleable standards of review prescribed in Deukmejian
and endorsed in AFL-CIO v. Eu are conducive to premature judicial
interposition. The following guidelines are submitted as a means of
preventing the courts from running aground upon either the rocks of
indulging majoritiarian intemperance or the shoals of judicial
usurpation.
147. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-91 (1947); M. REDISH, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 13 (1980).
148. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115-16 (1962).
149. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
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A. Preelection Review
Preelection invalidation of an initiative proposal should be lim-
ited to cases in which there is a clear showing of invalidity or a
showing that postelection review would be futile or would cause sub-
stantial waste. The advantages of preelection abstention are increas-
ingly diminished if a proposal is patently invalid. An invalid mea-
sure steals time and attention from the legitimate propositions on the
ballot' and depletes the resources of interested persons and organi-
zations, as well as state and local governments.151 These costs are a
small price to pay for the benefits of direct democracy when the pro-
posal is marginally invalid, and has a chance of being saved after
election by a narrowing interpretation or a creative construction.
However, the public cannot be expected to subsidize a proposal in
which prospective disqualification is an inevitability.
Most preelection challenges assert that the proponents failed to
follow statutory procedures. It is essential for any ballot campaign
that prescribed procedures be followed. Procedural compliance main-
tains the order and integrity of the initiative process and minimizes
electoral disruption. 52 Typical procedural challenges center on the
form of the petition, the validity of the signatures, and the propriety
of action taken by state officials in either reviewing the petition's
sufficiency or in preparing a title and summary for the ballot.' 5 ' In
order to resolve all doubts in favor of upholding the initiative power,
California courts require only substantial compliance with proce-
dural regulations. 154
Other common preelection challenges are quasi-procedural in
nature, such as the single-subject matter requirement. The single-
subject matter requirement, imposed by the state constitution,
commands that "an initiative measure embracing more than one sub-
ject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect. ' ' 156 The
150. 36 Cal. 3d at 697, 686 P.2d at 615, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
151. The government must monitor the progress of the campaign from the time drafts of
the proposal are submitted until the time votes are tallied. See supra notes 62-77 and accom-
panying text.
152. Assembly of Cal. v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638, 674, 639 P.2d 939, 961, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 297, 319 (1982).
153. Comment, supra note 123, at 469.
154. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 243, 583 P.2d 1281, 1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 256 (1978).
155. "An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to
the electors or have any effect." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
156. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). In McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d
787, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1948), the court overturned a proposed initiative measure
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purposes behind this limitation are to minimize voter confusion157
and to prevent "logrolling"-the combining of provisions that lack
genuine popular support with a popular but severable provision, in
an attempt to obtain majority approval for the unpopular provi-
sions. 158 A proposal that flouts this requirement by subsuming more
than one subject matter under a single proposition is prima facie
invalid; nothing is gained by deferring review until after election,
because at that point the measure must be invalidated anyway.
Some courts have expressed doubts as whether they retain the
equitable discretion to examine a measure before election if there is a
compelling showing that the substantive provisions of the initiative
are invalid.'5 9 Courts should possess this discretion, but must pro-
ceed with caution before pronouncing the substantive provisions
clearly invalid. The substantive provisions of a statutory initiative
can be clearly invalid if there is a conflict with state constitutional
law or federal law. But the substantive provisions of a constitutional
amendment initiative cannot conflict with state law, and thus cannot
be clearly invalid, unless there is a conflict with federal law. As one
court explained:
[C]onflict with existing articles or sections of the Constitution
can afford no logical basis for invalidating an initiative propo-
sal. When a newly adopted amendment does conflict with pre-
existing constitutional provisions, the new amendment necessa-
rily supersedes the previous provisions. Otherwise, an
amendment could no longer alter existing constitutional provi-
sions, and the amendment process might, in every case, be frus-
trated by the judicial determination that a given proposal con-
flicts with other provisions.160
B. Postelection Review
The proposed rule for postelection procedural review is the con-
containing such disparate subjects as gambling, civic centers, mining, fishing, city budgets, li-
quor control, senate reapportionment, and oleomargarine.
157. Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 97, 577 P.2d 652, 655-56, 145 Cal. Rptr. 517,
520-21 (1978) (Manuel, J., dissenting).
158. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 250, 651 P.2d 274, 282, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,
38 (1982). See generally Lowenstein, California Initiative Process: Demise of the Single-Sub-
ject Rule, 14 PAC. L.J. 1095 (1983).
159. 36 Cal. 3d at 697 n.l, 686 P.2d at 615 n.l, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 95 n.l.
160. Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Fla., 363 So. 2d 337, 341-42
(Fla. 1978). See also Answer of the Justices, 377 N.E. 2d 915, 916 n.2 (Mass. 1978). In the
event voters approve two conflicting amendments in the same election, the amendment receiv-
ing the highest number of votes prevails. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(b).
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verse of the proposed rule for preelection review. Contrary to current
California law, which allows review of any kind of challenge after
election,"" postelection procedural review should not be allowed in
the absence of a showing that a preelection challenge was impossible,
impracticable, or otherwise futile. Although the integrity of the initi-
ative process is enhanced when procedural objections are raised prior
to election, once a measure is approved, any procedural deficiencies
should be treated as a fait accompli. Postelection invalidation of an
initiated measure cannot retroactively purge a procedural deficiency
existing at the time it was presented to the electorate. Because courts
construe the language of an initiative in light of its preelection pub-
licity and its popular meaning, little danger exists that a procedur-
ally deficient petition would cause citizens to adopt something they
would otherwise have rejected.1 62 Consequently, voter approval of a
measure should not be upset for procedural irregularity when the
opportunity existed to contest a lack of compliance before election.
This proposed rule is designed to bring California in line with
the rule in most states. Courts in most states subscribe to the "elec-
tion cures all" doctrine, and prohibit postelection procedural at-
tacks. " A minority of states will entertain a postelection challenge,
but place a much higher burden of proof on the challenger."' Cali-
fornia, however, does not prohibit any kind of postelection challenge,
and uses the same unrestricted standards in the review of a postelec-
tion procedural challenge as in a preelection procedural challenge. "'
This is unfair to proponents who have the right to know as soon as
possible whether the formal requisites have been met.'66
The bulk of substantive review should occur after election. Once
the electorate approves a measure, all substantive issues become jus-
ticiable, because the issues are no longer unripe or in danger of be-
coming moot. Measures that are clearly invalid, as well as those that
are not, can be reviewed at this point. The failure to contest a clearly
161. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 242-43, 583 P.2d 1281, 1298-99, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 256-57 (1978).
162. Comment, supra note 123, at 489.
163. See, e.g., Renck v. Superior Court, 66 Ariz. 320, 187 P.2d 656 (1947).
164. Comment, supra note 123, at 481.
165. See, e.g., Broshnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 254, 651 P.2d 274, 284, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 30, 40 (1982); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 187, 599 P.2d 587, 614, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 308 (1979); Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 242-44, 583 P.2d 1281, 1298-300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 256-58 (1978).
166. Gayle v. Hamm, 25 Cal. App. 3d 250, 257, 101 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634 (1972). One
feature of the California Elections Code is early notification of procedural deficiencies. See,
e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3520, 3521 (West Supp. 1985).
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invalid measure prior to election should not bar a postelection sub-
stantive challenge; unlike procedural compliance, voter approval does
not purge a substantively invalid measure of its infirmities.
The fact that review occurs after election does not, of course,
provide the judiciary with a roving commission to strike down mea-
sures that it deems unwise. It merely authorizes judicial scrutiny "in
the light of established constitutional standards.1' 11 7 The record of
the supreme court in upholding approved measures is mixed. The
court seldom finds a proposition unconstitutional, but it does not
shrink from diluting the intended effect through interpretation. For
example, the court upheld the property tax reforms of Proposition
13,'68 but severely limited the impact of that measure through a nar-
row construction of key language." 9 The court also upheld the right
of the people to institute capital punishment, 7 ' but has refused to
allow a single execution to proceed.' The publicity surrounding
postelection litigation has probably constrained the court from nulli-
fying the effect of more propositions. The recent shift toward pree-
lection review suggests that the court plans to play a more active role
in the initiative process by taking advantage of the minimal public
awareness and controversy such review offers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The initiative is a less than ideal device for enacting legislation.
Voters have been known to misuse their powers from time to time.
But by and large, citizens have proved to be responsible lawmakers.
And the people, no less than the legislatures, are entitled to experi-
ment. The initiative is the best instrument available for ascertaining
the popular will and for translating that will directly into law. As
such, direct legislation is entitled to the highest respect and defer-
ence. California courts should take this into account by refusing to
invalidate a qualified ballot measure until after election, absent a
clear showing of invalidity. Deferring review until after election will
not only ensure that judicial resources are not squandered on propos-
167. Amador Valley Joint Union High Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d
208, 219, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241 (1978).
168. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22
Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
169. City of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648 P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713
(1982).
170. People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979).
171. Death Penalty Sabotaged, Los Angeles Daily J., Nov. 9, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
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als that might die of their own weight, but also will inhibit the judi-
ciary from stilling the waters of self-governance.
